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Natural Hazards and Nuclear 
Power Plant Safety
Tamás János Katona
Abstract
The safety of nuclear power plants with respect of natural hazards can be 
ensured by adequate characterization of hazards and proven design solutions to 
cope with natural hazard effects. Design and severe accident management require 
characterization of very rare event. The events identified for the design basis and 
for the safety analysis are with annual probability 10−4–10−5 and 10−7, respectively. 
In this chapter, a brief insight into the actual issues of natural hazard safety of 
nuclear power plants and related scientific challenges is provided. The state of the 
art of ensuring safety of nuclear power plants with respect to natural hazard is 
briefly presented with focus on the preparedness to the accident sequences caused 
by rare natural phenomena. The safety relevance of different hazards and vulner-
ability of NPPs to different hazards are discussed. Specific attention is made to the 
non-predictable phenomena with sudden devastating effects like earthquakes and 
fault ruptures. Post-event conditions that affect the on-site and off-site accident 
management activities are also considered. The “specific-to-nuclear” aspects of the 
characterization of hazards are discussed. This is a great challenge for the sciences 
dealing with hazard characterization. The possibility for ensuring nuclear safety 
is demonstrated presenting cases when the nuclear power plants survived severe 
natural phenomena.
Keywords: nuclear power plant, safety, design, design basis, severe accident, 
operational experience
1. Introduction
Nuclear power plants (NPPs) have negligible cradle-to-grave environmental 
impacts. In spite of this fact, nuclear power plants (NPPs) are potentially high-
risk facilities, since the consequences of a severe accident at a nuclear power 
plant can be enormous. Severe accidents of NPPs affect large area and have 
environmentally regional and economically global character [1]. The accident at 
the Chernobyl NPP shows the extent and severity and long-term consequences 
of the nuclear disasters. Natural hazard safety of nuclear power plants became 
an eminent importance after the Great Tohoku earthquake on the 11th of March 
2011 and subsequent disaster of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP. The case of the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP demonstrated the tragic outcome of the interaction 
between severe natural phenomena and nuclear power plant, that is, the severe 
natural phenomena are a great threat per itself, but their damaging effects could 
be multiplied when a natural phenomenon damages a hazardous facility like a 
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nuclear power plant. The importance of the preparedness to the natural hazards 
at NPPs has recently been demonstrated when the Hurricane Florence September 
2018 endangered the NPPs in North and South Carolinas.
Majority of the existing nuclear power plants will be operated during the 
twenty-first century, and there are ongoing new construction projects. There are 
prestigious institutions and authors justifying that the nuclear power is needed for 
sustainable power supply (e.g., [2]). There are good enough reasons for continuous 
efforts to ensure and enhance the nuclear safety.
Protection of NPPs against natural hazard effects has been required since earlier 
times of industrial deployment of nuclear power. Related design requirements were 
getting more and more stringent with accumulated knowledge on hazards, with 
their consequences, as well with the development of design methodologies and 
supporting empirical evidences. All probable at the site natural hazards should be 
accounted for in the design of NPPs.
The risk due to NPPs is controlled and reduced by design means ensuring very 
low annual probability of a large release of radioactive substances. The acceptable 
annual probability limit for large release is ≤10−6. The concept of defense in depth 
(DiD) is applied for protection of the people and environment [3, 4]. According to 
this, a hierarchy of protective means and procedures should be designed and imple-
mented for preventing the escalation of a failure to accidents and to maintain the 
integrity of physical barriers between the radioactive substances and environment, 
even if a protective feature fails. There are a series of physical barriers nested inside 
one another for separation of the radioactive substances from the environment: the 
fuel matrix, the fuel cladding, the primary pressure boundary, and the contain-
ment. The effectiveness of barriers should be maintained in every operational state, 
and the last barrier, the containment, should perform its retaining function as long 
as possible during accident sequences.
In this chapter, a brief insight into the actual issues of natural hazard safety 
and related scientific challenges is provided. The state of the art of ensuring safety 
of NPPs with respect to natural hazard is briefly presented with focus on the 
preparedness to the accident sequences caused by rare natural phenomena. The 
safety relevance of different hazards and vulnerability of NPPs to different hazards 
are discussed. Specific attention is made to the non-predictable phenomena with 
sudden devastating effects like earthquakes and fault ruptures. Post-event condi-
tions that affect the on-site and off-site accident management activities are also 
considered. The “specific-to-nuclear” aspects of the characterization of hazards are 
discussed. Design and severe accident management require characterization of very 
rare events with annual probability 10−4–10−5 for the design basis and up to 10−7 
for the safety analysis. This is a great challenge for the sciences dealing with hazard 
characterization. There might be epistemic limitations, and a positivist approach to 
the possibility of learning the phenomena is questionable. The epistemic issues of 
natural hazard characterization and management are also briefly considered.
The approach followed in the chapter is a typical positivist, engineering 
approach. The hazards accounted for in the design of conventional, potentially 
high-risk industrial facilities, are about hundred times more likely and far less 
dangerous than the design-basis hazards for the nuclear power plants; apart from 
this cardinal difference, the development and design of nuclear power plants are 
carried out according to the same logic as any other technical objects, that is, the 
design shall be based on evidences, verified knowledge, and experimentally proven 
methods. The design requirements and safety analysis procedures are briefly 
presented with the main focus on the rare and unpredictable phenomena.
The statement of the head of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent 
Investigation Commission should be understood, which recognized the Fukushima 
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accident as a typical “man-made disaster” that could be foreseen and prevented [5]. 
In spite of the truth of this statement, the extreme natural phenomena can cause 
enormous consequences at NPPs. The question is how frequent can an extreme 
event happen that can trigger a nuclear catastrophe, and whether the risk due to 
these events can be reduced to an acceptable for the society level?
Nuclear power plants are stigmatized by two severe accidents, Chernobyl acci-
dent, and by the Fukushima NPP accident caused by extreme natural phenomena. 
However, the operation of nuclear power plants is characterized not only by these 
accidents but also by more than 10,000 reactor years of positive experience. There 
are studies predicting 50% of chances for occurrence of a Fukushima-type accident 
within every 60–100 years [6] and auguring decreasing the frequency but increas-
ing the severity of nuclear accidents. The lessons learned from the Fukushima 
accident changed the paradigm of the design; preparedness to extreme improbable 
situations became a great importance. In this chapter the availability of proven 
technical means against natural hazards is demonstrated on the practical examples. 
The presentation of the manageability of natural hazard effects should not relativ-
ize the safety issues, just providing realistic insights compared to those determined 
by the shock of the Fukushima catastrophe.
Natural hazards can also cause economic impact due to inability of being oper-
ated at 100% level, and/or restoration is needed for the restart of the plant. These 
aspects will gain more importance due to increasing severity, frequency, and dura-
tion of some hazards, for example, extremes due to climate change that affect the 
efficiency of nuclear power plants especially those with freshwater cooling. These 
aspects of vulnerability are briefly considered.
An overall presentation of the state of the art of hazard evaluation and natural 
hazard risk management is not intended in the chapter. The focus is limited to the 
recent practice of the nuclear industry.
2. Hazards and their severity
Nuclear power plant can be constructed and operated at a particular site without 
undue risk to the health and safety of the public by ensuring the confinement of 
radioactive substances. From the technical point of view, this means that some 
fundamental safety functions should be ensured during and after the natural 
phenomena: the reactor should be shut-down,  subcriticality of the reactor core and 
the spent fuel pool should be ensured, and the fuel in the reactor core and the spent 
fuel pool should be cooled. The most important function is the retaining capability 
of the reactor containment that should be kept leak-tight as long as possible.
Plants are designed per principle of defense in depth (DiD) [3, 4], applying 
overlapping provisions (design, operational, etc.), so that, if a failure were to occur, 
it would be detected and compensated for or corrected by appropriate measures 
returning the plant to the normal operational conditions. In case this is not succeed-
ing, a hierarchy of protective means and procedures are designed in preventing the 
escalation of a failure to accidental event, even if a protective measure fails. These 
protective means are redundant safety systems that are conservatively designed to 
withstand even effects of natural hazards beyond those accounted for in the design.
The effects of natural hazards selected for the basis of design are loads defined 
conservatively and used in the design calculations according to codes and standards. 
Therefore, in deterministic sense, the effects of natural hazards within the basis of 
design should not cause accidents, or any failures, called initiating events, leading 
to accident sequences. Off course, the probability of failure of some systems or 
structures is not equal to zero, but the adequate design ensures low probability of 
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failure with high confidence. The conservative design ensures sufficient margin to 
resist the effects exceeding in some extent the design-basis level.
DiD also means a box-in-box design of physical barriers for confining the 
radioactive substances. The first barrier is the fuel matrix, the ceramic uranium 
dioxide pellets, and the second one is the cladding of fuel pins. The third barrier 
is the pressure-retaining boundary of the primary circuit, and the fourth and very 
last barrier is the containment building. The heat generation by the decay of fission 
product in the fuel lasts long after the chain reaction is stopped. If the residual heat 
will not be removed, the first two barriers the fuel matrix and the cladding tubes 
containing the pellets will be overheated, melted, and damaged. The third barrier 
is the pressure-retaining boundary of the primary circuit. The fourth barrier is the 
containment building.
Severity of natural hazards can be categorized according to the level of DiD 
affected, complexity, and duration of post-event situation. The highest level of 
severity is caused by rare, sudden, non-predictable, beyond-design-basis events 
with high damaging potential that can cause sudden loss of safety functions (that 
is called as cliff-edge effect). Retaining capability of the containment can be lost, 
and significant amount of radioactive material can be released. Compared to the 
above case, less severe are the hazard consequences, when the fundamental safety 
functions can be restored or ensured by severe accident management measures, that 
is, the accident sequence can be controlled, and the off-site releases can be limited. 
Moderate severity are those hazards, effects of which are within the design margins. 
In this case, the control of accident sequences for limiting the radiological releases 
and preventing escalation to severe accidents can be ensured by design means and 
procedures. Less severe are the hazards with effects within the design basis, espe-
cially, if a forecast or warning of the occurrence of dangerous event is possible. The 
effects of these hazards are manageable by operational features and measures.
The economic losses are strictly correlated by the extent of damage, possibility, 
and effort needed for restoring and restarting the plant operation, doses from releases, 
needs, and extent of off-site measures (evacuation and decontamination of large 
area).
Ranking the hazards with respect to safety and economic significance:
A. Sudden, non-predictable, beyond-design-basis event with high damag-
ing potential, beyond-design-basis, significant damages over large region 
hindering accident management—Large releases due to containment failure, 
loss of plant, and evacuation of large area (Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP, Great 
Tohoku Earthquake 2011).
B. Sudden, non-predictable, beyond-design-basis event with high damaging 
potential but within the designed margins—Justification of safety and resto-
ration works (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, Niigata-Chuetsu Oki Earthquake, 
2007, North Anna NPP, 2011).
C. Sudden, non-predictable event with high damaging potential within the 
design basis—Outage for limited time (Onagawa NPP, tsunami due to Great 
Tohoku Earthquake 2011).
D. Events with damage potential, warning, and preventive measures are pos-
sible—Outage for limited time or restart after the event (NPPs impacted 
by Katrina hurricane, 2005; floods at Blayais NPP, France, 1999, and at Fort 
Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station, USA, in 2011).
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E. Warning is possible, and effects are manageable by operational features and 
measures—Operation at a reduced power level and no safety consequences 
(Cernavoda NPP, Romania, ow-river level 2009).
An exhaustive list of external hazards that can affect the safety of nuclear 
power plants, including the list of possible correlated and independent concurrent 
hazards, are given, for example, in [7]. The nuclear safety regulations use a generic 
formula requiring identification and characterization of natural phenomena that 
are specific to the region and which have the potential to affect the safety of the 
nuclear installation [8–11]. Examples of hazards and their possible primary conse-
quences are presented in Table 1.
In Table 1 examples of hazards are indicated, which can be or should be 
excluded by proper site selection (collapse of karst, avalanches, landslides). There 
are examples in Table 1 for hazards, which can be excluded by engineering means 
(flood protection, soil improvements). Although the possibility of mitigation 
of some volcanic effects (tephra fallout, missiles, gas emissions, debris flows) is 
considered as realistic [12], it is preferable to exclude the volcanic hazard from the 
design basis of nuclear power plants.
The hazards accounted for in the design of the plant should be differentiated 
with regard their basic features: possibility of forecast, characteristic time for 
evolvement of phenomenon, possibility to avoid administrative or operational 
measures, possibility of protection of the site, and modification of adverse site 
features.
The earthquakes affect the site and large surrounding region. It is impossible 
to foresee and it happens suddenly. The effects of earthquake should be “as far as 
reasonably practicable” managed by design solutions even for the cases exceeding 
the design basis. The operators should be prepared to manage the post-earthquake 
extreme situations. Here, the long-lasting effect is caused by the damages at the site 
and in the area surrounding the plant. The dwellings of the operational personnel 
and the local infrastructure (transportation, communication) can be affected [13]; 
therefore, arrangements should be in place for the replacement of personnel and 
logistical support of the plant.
Contrary to the above example, reliable forecasts can be made for the majority 
of hydrometeorological extremes, like hurricanes, tornados, typhoons, extreme 
precipitation and temperatures, and floods. This allows implementation of protec-
tive measures and preparation of the NPP for the extreme situation. The operators 
should have procedures and means for preparedness to the possible abnormal situ-
ations. For most meteorological extremes, the implementation of protective design 
solutions can be combined with operation procedures for both, ensuring the safety 
and possible fast recovery of normal operation. Reduction of cooling capacity due 
to clogging of cooling water system can be managed in a similar way.
There are meteorological extremes with extended duration, for example, heat 
wave and drought. These long-lasting conditions can also affect the operational 
personnel and the logistical support of the site.
There are hazards having similar effects, for example, the straight wind and 
tornado missiles and hail cause an impact effect. Obviously, the hazard with the 
largest impact effect will dominate the design of structures important for safety.
Simultaneously occurring hazards should also be considered in the design. It 
is interesting to mention that almost 600 possible combinations can be identified 
according to [7].
There are causally connected hazards where one hazard may cause another haz-
ard, but the other hazard can occur by themselves (like earthquake and tsunami). 
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There are simultaneous hazards when one hazard is a prerequisite for a correlated 
hazard (earthquake-liquefaction).
There are associated hazards, which are probable to occur at the same time due 
to a common root cause or having same physical origin, for example, the storms and 
lightning and storms and extreme precipitation.
The analysis of the probability of event combinations should consider the dura-
tion of the events. The exact coincidence of the demand is decisive for the design 
and safety. It is possible for more than one independent natural event to occur 
Table 1. 
Hazards, hazard effects, and possible consequences at NPPs.
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simultaneously at the site. Combinations of frequent hazards with similar effects 
should be considered carefully, since the simultaneous effects can be superimposed. 
It should be noted that simultaneous occurrence of two independent low-frequency 
hazards is considered as unreasonable.
3. Designing for safety
As it is shown above, the risks of nuclear power plants due to natural hazards 
can be controlled in two ways:
a. The hazards can be avoided via site selection deeming the sites unsuitable for 
the location of NPP.
b. Appropriate design and/or administrative measures shall be implemented for 
site and plant protection.
In the first case, if the effects of external events affecting the sites and the region 
cannot be compensated by proven engineering solutions for protection of the NPP, 
the site should be discarded.
The hazards can be qualified as avoided, if it is physically impossible to occur under 
the conditions at the site or if the hazard can be considered with a high degree of con-
fidence to be extremely unlikely. For example, landslides should not be expected, if the 
site is located in a flat area; collapse of karst should not be expected if there are no karst 
formations below the site. Specific considerations on how to define the acceptable low 
probability will be given below. Rules and requirements for site survey and selection 
are given, for example, in [8, 10]. The International Atomic Energy Agency published a 
series of design guidances focusing on different hazards [12, 14–16].
In the second case, the hazards shall be properly identified, characterized, and 
accounted for in the design basis as required in [10]. The performance of the plant 
safety features should be ensured by the design and/or administrative measures for 
the design-basis hazard effects, that is, for the case of design-basis hazards, very low 
probability of failure of the safety-related SSCs should be justified with high confi-
dence. The generic design rules and requirements are set, for example, in the [9]. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency published series of design guidance focusing on 
different hazards [17, 18]. The applicable design requirements are as follows:
• Apply reasonable design conservatism for design-basis hazards that provides 
sufficient margins for the case, if the effects of hazards exceeding the level 
accounted for in the design.
• Apply passive safety features (no need of external or emergency power supply).
• Develop pre-event preparedness and post-event procedures.
• Apply adequate means and procedures to coop with hazards that are predictable.
• Ensure that the safety systems intended to be used in design-basis accidents will 
be not adversely affected by the natural hazards.
• Ensure sufficient resources at multiunit sites.
• Consider temporary limitation of the off-site logistical support.
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The generic design principles applicable are related either to system engineering 
or structural and layout aspects. These are:
• Diversity via employing different principles of operation.
• Redundancy of components and systems.
• Independence of system and components.
• Using failsafe components.
• Avoiding structural interactions.
• Ensuring physically separation of redundant safety systems.
The design solutions can also be classified as:
• Systems-solutions: inherently safe design, use of preferable passive safety sys-
tems capable to function even in the case of beyond-design-basis hazards.
• Structural solutions: optimized for hazard effect structures with sufficient 
capacity to avoid sudden loss of function.
• Layout solutions: separating the redundant safety systems.
For the optimal use of design means, the SSCs are usually categorized in accordance 
of their safety relevance and intended function during and after the natural phenom-
ena. This allows to implement the graded approach regarding design conservatism, 
quality, and reliability requirements. The safety systems are usually in the highest 
category that should be designed to withstand high-magnitude low-annual-probability 
hazardous effects, while the systems needed for the continuous operation only are 
designed in accordance of nonnuclear building/construction codes and standards for a 
moderate magnitude and for 10−2–10−3 annual probability effects, as usual.
It should be emphasized that the natural hazards affect the entire plant, all 
facilities at the site, or even the whole region. Therefore, the events could simulta-
neously challenge several redundant or diverse trains of a safety system, causing 
multiple failures of SSCs.
In the state-of-the-art practice, plant conditions more severe and complex as 
those accounted for in the design basis are considered as design extension condi-
tions. In design extension conditions, prevention of severe accident, mitigation of 
the consequences of complex plant conditions, and the integrity of the containment 
should be maintained by additional safety features or extension of the capability of 
safety systems as far as is reasonably practicable.
The chances for multiple failures and complex plant conditions due to natural 
hazards can be rather large, if the magnitude of event exceeds those accounted for 
in the design.
4. Safety goal, design basis, and beyond-design-basis hazards
Let us start with a simple consideration. The simplest formulation of the risk due 
to some damaging effect is the  R =  P fail ∙ C , where  P fail is the probability of the failure 
caused by that effect and leading to the consequences with measure  C .
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The probability  P fail depends on the probability of occurring of an event with dam-
aging effect E,  P (E) and on the conditional probability of failure if the effect is equal to 
E, that is,  P ( fail if E) . Thus, the total probability of failure can be written as  
 P fail = P (E) ∙ P ( fail if E) . The state-of-the-art design procedures and standards ensure 
a very low probability of failure with respect to the effects accounted for in the design,  
E DB ; this can be expressed as  P ( fail if E ≤  E DB ) ≪ 1 . There are hazards damaging the 
potential of which can be characterized by several parameters; thus,  E =  { E 1 ,  E 2 , ⋯ , E n } .
In the practice of the nuclear industry, the term “fail” could have several 
meanings. The term “failure” can be associated to a single component, to a system 
performing certain safety function, and to the entire plant, respectively. As it has 
been mentioned above, for ensuring the confinement of radioactive substances, the 
nuclear power plants are designed per principle of defense in depth. Failure of some 
structures, systems, and components (SSCs) can trigger a sequence of events at the 
plant deviating from normal operational conditions. If a sequence was considered 
in the design basis of the plant, the safe stable condition of the plant should be 
ensured by safety systems. The safety systems shall ensure the control of reactiv-
ity, that is, the chain reaction in the reactor shall be stopped, the heat generated by 
decay of radioactive fission elements shall be removed from the reactor core to the 
ultimate heat sink (to the environment), and the radioactive substances shall be 
confined in the fuel elements.
Thus, the term “fail” can be first linked to the core damage (CD) and to the loss 
of the first two barriers (fuel matrix and cladding). The annual probability of the 
core damage,  P CD , is limited by the nuclear regulations. The acceptable value for a 
new design should be less than 10−5 summarized over all accident sequences. This 
can be expressed as  P CD = P ( fail if E) ∙ P (E) ≤  10 −5 . Thus, the safety systems should 
withstand the effects of natural hazards and fulfill their intended functions for 
avoiding the core damage. The acceptable probability of loss of any safety function 
due to failure caused by natural hazards should not exceed 10−6/a.
In very improbable cases when the safety features fail, and the conditions are 
more severe than those accounted for in the design, the radioactive releases shall be 
kept as low as practicable. The most important objective of this level is the protec-
tion of the confinement function. In this case, the term “fail” is linked to the large 
release (LR) of radioactive substances to the environment. It is as dangerous as 
earlier it happens in the course of the severe accident. The annual probability of 
the early large releases,  P LR , is also limited by the nuclear regulations. Its allowable 
value for a new design should be  P LR = P ( fail if E) ∙ P (E) ≤  10 −6 summarized over all 
accident sequences. It means the acceptable value for a singular sequence should be 
less approximate by an order of a magnitude.
It is obvious from the above consideration that a hazard could be screened out 
and neglected on the basis of probabilistic consideration, if the probability of 
occurrence is less than the acceptable for severe accident probabilistic limit with a 
high degree of confidence, that is, 10−7/a or less.
Since the consequences of nuclear accidents caused by natural hazards can be 
enormous, the risk should be reduced by selecting effects for the basis of design 
with very low annual probability. Therefore, the magnitude of natural hazard 
accounted for in the design basis should be associated to the probability 10−4–10−5 
per year depending on the strength or capacity assured by the design. Some excep-
tion is the regulation regarding the tornado hazard in the USA, where the tornado 
hazard is a reality due to meteorological and topographical conditions. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has determined the best-estimate design-basis tornado 
wind speeds for new reactors, which correspond to the exceedance frequency of 
10–7 per year [19]. Probably, the reason for this conservative approach is the com-
plexity of post-event conditions.
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The SSCs should be categorized regarding their safety relevance/function. A 
target performance,  P T , should be set to each category. The hazard exceedance 
frequency for the design of the particular SSC,  H D , should be selected taking into 
account the achievable resistance,  R H , that is the conditional probability of failure 
for the effects with  H D , that is,  P T =  H D ∙  R H .
Care should be taken to the convolved frequency, where there are multiple 
parameters used to define an event. For example, it is not reasonable to consider 
a 10−4 intensity of a storm with a 10−4 duration of a storm unless there is a clear 
correlation. Obviously, there is a strong correlation between the phenomena having 
the same physical origin.
Regarding combinations of independent events, the same probabilistic criterion 
can be applied as for the single event, that is, a 10−4/a earthquake should not be 
combined with a 10−4/a strong wind. Contrary to this, for example, the combina-
tion of a big storm with a high tide could lead to the external flooding of a power 
plant.
Specific considerations are made in case of causal-related events, like earthquake 
and liquefaction, earthquake and tsunami, or earthquake and failure of structures 
protecting the sites.
In case of liquefaction, based on the soil date and the design-basis earthquake 
magnitude, the conditional probability of liquefaction can be calculated. The total 
probability—earthquake and liquefaction—should be less than the probabilistic 
screening criterion for neglecting the liquefaction hazard (see, e.g., [20]). This 
condition can also be formulated in terms of safety factor with respect to liquefac-
tion. If the site soil conditions are improved by engineering methods, this probabil-
ity and/or value of safety factor can be applied for acceptance criterion for the soil 
improvement.
There are multiple causally correlated hazards. For example, possibility of 
multiple causally linked hazards has been recognized at Tricastin site in France 
that initiated a focused safety justification in 2017 [21]. The level of the Tricastin 
site is 6 meters below the nearby channel level. The nuclear site is protected by 
embarkment. Although the embarkment would resist the maximum historically 
credible earthquake, it could not be excluded that it would fail if the design-basis 
earthquake of the plant hits the site. If the site would be flooded, loss of off-site and 
on-site electrical power supply and failure of the cooling systems of the reactors 
could be expected. Limited access to the site would hinder the emergency response. 
In this case the seismic resistance of the embarkment is the key question, since the 
plant remains safe in case of design-basis earthquake. The probability of loss of 
safety function in this case is defined by the probability of design-basis earthquake, 
since the embarkment failure and the consequent flooding are highly probable if a 
design-basis earthquake happens.
In case of causally linked hazards, the damaging effects of root cause event 
and the consequential event would not be necessarily simultaneous. The timing of 
effects should be considered in the design.
The above considerations with the small probabilities may seem like the usual 
reasoning and magic of the nuclear industry. As a matter of fact, that is the state 
of the art. However, this is recognized to be not sufficient. The generic design 
paradigm afore Fukushima Dai-ichi accident was “design for sufficient low prob-
ability of effects for ensuring the acceptable risk.” The new design paradigm is 
“to be prepared for the impossible.” Since a devastating natural event can never 
be completely ruled out, the necessary provisions for managing a radiological 
emergency situation, onsite and offsite, must be planned, tested, and regularly 
reviewed [22, 23].
11
Natural Hazards and Nuclear Power Plant Safety
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.83492
5. Difficulties of the safe design
Two fundamental questions have to be answered here:
1. Whether the characterization of rare natural hazards can be performed with 
high enough assurance? The question is related to the possibility of definition 
of the hazard curve, which is the annual probability of an event that will occur 
at the NPP site with a damaging effect exceeding a given threshold.
2. Whether there are proven engineering solutions available for ensuring enough 
capability of NPPs to withstand safely the effects of hazards? In other words: 
Whether the design will ensure  P ( fail if E ≤  E DB ) ≪ 1 for the conditional prob-
ability of failure? The question is related to the vulnerability/fragility of the NPP.
Presentation of the state-of-the-art methodologies for hazard evaluation is out 
of scope of the recent chapter. The nuclear industry is adapting the most novel sci-
entific achievements for the site characterization and investigation (see, e.g., [24]). 
The hazards accounted for in the design are subject to regular review and update in 
countries where the regime of periodic safety review is established. Most extensive 
programs for natural hazard evaluation and upgrading and justification of operat-
ing plant safety have been implemented in the USA and several Eastern-European 
countries, where the operators should deal with the issues of underestimation of the 
seismic hazard for the design basis. Summary description of these programs is given 
in [25–28]. Events, like the Great Tohoku Earthquake, triggered an overall review, 
correction, and justification of hazard evaluation at the plants (see the stress test 
initiated by the European Union and the reviews and upgrading programs in several 
countries, e.g., [29, 30]).
The Fukushima accident is the worst-case example for improper character-
ization of tsunami hazard. The NPPs can be protected from the flooding due to 
tsunamis, assuming that the design-basis wave height is adequately defined and 
the uncertainties of the tsunami characterization are properly compensated by 
the conservative design. Contrary to the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant, the 14-m high 
seawall protected the Onagawa NPP from flooding due to tsunami [31].
The basic difficulties of the hazard characterization are the epistemic and 
aleatoric uncertainties that should be evaluated and accounted for.
Considering the design-basis hazards, the uncertainty is compensated by 
conservative approach: in the definition of the demand and calculation of the 
resistance of the SSCs. The generic design rules are fixed in the nuclear regulations 
and acceptable standards (see, e.g., [9] and [32, 33]).
It should be emphasized, that in the engineering practice, prediction of the 
effects of hazardous phenomena is recognized to be “a posteriori” uncertain. 
Therefore, the design should cope with this uncertainty not only within the design 
basis but also beyond.
It is required that the NPPs should be prepared for the unexpected exceedance of 
 E DB and the sudden loss of safety functions (a cliff-edge phenomena) shall be elimi-
nated. This can be expressed as  P ( fail if E ≳  E DB ) ≲ M , where  M is some acceptable 
probability of failure for unfortunate cases, if the design-basis effect is exceeded by 
a certain value  E =  E DB + 𝛿E .
Very important are how large should be the acceptable value of  M and  𝛿E .
In the case of earthquakes exceeding the design basis, the design should pro-
vide an adequate margin to protect items ultimately necessary to prevent escala-
tion of the event sequence to severe accident. According to the regulations, the 
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best-estimate approach can be adopted for the evaluation of this margin [34]. The 
high-confidence of low-probability of failure (HCLPF) could be the measure of  
the seismic margin [35, 36]. For new plants, depending on the regulatory frame-
work and design practice, a HCLPF capacity of at least 1.67 [37] or 1.4 [38] times 
the design-basis peak ground acceleration is required to be demonstrated. These 
values are based on the conservatism of the nuclear design standards and justified 
by extensive studies. In the standard ASCE/SEI 43–05 [33], it is proposed to accept 
the probability of unacceptable performance less than about 10% for a ground 
motion equal to 150% of the design-basis ground motion, while for the design basis, 
the probability of unacceptable performance less than about a 1%.
The above concept can be adopted for other hazards as it is proposed, for 
example, in [37].
6. Justification of design tools and solutions
The design tools/solutions can be proven:
a. Directly by NPP experiences (events and damages).
b. Indirectly by:
• Reconnaissance and analysis of event consequences and damages (nonnuclear).
• Experiments (shaking table tests, wind tunnels, etc.).
• Numerical analysis and experiments.
From our point of view, the most important are the real NPP experiences regard-
ing natural hazard events and consequences. There are several sources archiving the 
experiences of extreme natural events. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
International Seismic Safety Centre collected the information on the earthquake 
experiences reported by the operators. There are several hundreds of significant 
earthquakes registered within 300 km epicentral distance from NPPs.
The World Nuclear Association has also collected the data of nuclear accidents 
that could be compared by other industrial activities [39].
The European Commission Joint Research Centre also published a study on the 
external hazard-related events at NPPs [40]. According to this study, apart from 
earthquakes and tsunamis (Fukushima case), the fouling events (biological fouling 
of water intakes affecting also the ultimate heat sink and chemical fouling causing 
corrosion) and extreme weather conditions, including lightning strikes and floods, 
are dominating. A few events reported have safety significantly according to the 
International Nuclear Event Scale.
In the USA the Nuclear Energy Institute published a fact sheet on the response 
of US NPPs to natural events starting with June 2011 Missouri River (Nebraska) 
flooding up to September 2018 as the Hurricane Florence threatened the NPPs in 
the Southeast region of the USA and including also the 23rd of August 2011 beyond-
design-basis seismic event at North Anna NPP in Virginia [41].
The examples show that the nuclear plants can withstand and properly respond 
to extreme natural events, if the design basis defined is adequate that was not the 
case at the Fukushima site with respect to the tsunami. The industry has the tools, 
the analytical and testing capabilities, and the consolidated standards to design and 
build safe plants.
13
Natural Hazards and Nuclear Power Plant Safety
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.83492
6.1 Justification for possibility protection by the experiences of NPPs
6.1.1 Earthquakes: vibratory ground motion
There are plenty of examples demonstrating that the codes and standards 
accepted in the nuclear praxis ensure sufficient capacity of SSCs to withstand the 
ground vibratory effects of earthquakes.
Although the recorded ground motions exceeded those values for what the 
plants were designed, the safety consequences of the earthquakes were negligi-
ble. That was the case of Miyagi earthquake (August 2005) at the Onagawa NPP 
and the Chūetsu offshore earthquake (July 2007) at the site of the Kashiwazaki-
Kariwa NPP [42]. In case of the Great Tohoku earthquake, the behavior of 
13 nuclear units in the impacted area on the East shore of the Honshu Island 
demonstrated high resistance against ground vibrations due to earthquake. Even 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant survived the strong motion period of the earth-
quake. In August 2011 the North Anna plant in Virginia, USA, also survived 
a beyond-design-basis earthquake thanks to the designed and built margins. 
The North Anna case demonstrated also the adequacy of definition of damage 
criteria formulated in terms of cumulative absolute velocity and justified the 
correctness of predefined measure of margin. Although the ground motion 
experienced at the site exceeded the design-basis level, the damaging effect of 
the earthquake was found below the margin evaluated, and the damages were 
really negligible [43].
Sufficient capability of plants to withstand beyond-design-basis vibratory 
motion of earthquakes has been demonstrated by the stress tests performed in 
the European Union and by focused reviews implemented in other countries. The 
stress tests have been aimed to the review of seismic hazard assessments for sites 
of nuclear power plants and to the verification of the design bases, as well as to the 
evaluation of margins against external hazard (mainly earthquakes and floods) 
effects, whether the beyond-design-basis hazard effects can cause cliff-edge effect, 
that is, sudden loss of safety functions due to effects exceeding the design-basis one. 
Information on these programs in the European Union is provided at http://www.
ensreg.eu/EU-Stress-Tests. Information regarding post-Fukushima measures in the 
USA are available at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/ops-experience/japan-
dashboard.html and for Japan at https://www.nsr.go.jp/english/library/index.html, 
respectively.
6.1.2 Flooding
Food safety can be ensured by combination of technical and procedural 
measures, reducing the power generation or shutting down the reactors. The 
protection of plants against floods is feasible even at rather unfortunate sites like 
the Tricastin one [21]. In spite of this, floods at some sites caused safety issues. 
For example, at Fort Calhoun site in 2011 [41], the plant should be protected by 
extraordinary temporary measures. The flood and fire resulted in a 3-year shut-
down of the plant. At Blayais Nuclear Power Plant in 1999 [44], the high tide and 
storm flooded the plant and caused an event Level 2 according to the International 
Nuclear Event Scale. Safety upgrading measures and improved procedures have 
been developed and implemented to achieve the required safety level. The case 
turned the attention to event combinations that are capable to cause extreme 
flood event. Both cases reveal the importance of design-basis definition, regular 
review of the hazard characterization, and checking the protection capabilities 
and upgrading if necessary.
Natural Hazards - Risk, Exposure, Response, and Resilience
14
The NPPs can be protected from the flooding due to tsunamis, assuming that 
the design-basis wave height is adequately defined and the uncertainties of the 
tsunami characterization is properly compensated by the conservative design. The 
case of Onagawa NPP demonstrates that the proper definition of the design-basis 
tsunami height is an essential precondition of the safety. On the 11th of March 2011 
at Onagawa plant, all safety systems functioned as designed, the reactors automati-
cally were shut down, and no damage of safety related systems, structures, and 
components (SSCs) occurred [31]. The Madras NPP also survived the December 
2004 tsunami. Although the fatal underestimation of the design-basis tsunami wave 
height at the Fukushima Dai-ichi site cannot be compensated simply by designed 
margins, even in this case, a conscious layout of emergency diesel generator would 
save the plant.
6.1.3 Meteorological extremes
The extreme cold and heat should not cause design difficulties that is justified by 
Kola and Bilibino NPPs in subpolar region of Russia and Bushehr NPP in Iran and 
Madras and Kudankulam NPP in Tamil Nadu, India.
The real experiences demonstrate that the NPPs can be protected from extreme 
storms and hurricanes [41]. There are proven solutions to protect the NPPs against 
extreme winds. In August 1992 the Turkey Point NPP survived the Andrew hurri-
cane with 230 km/h wind speed (280 km/h gusts). The Sandy hurricane in October 
2012 hit 34 US plants that survived the storm. Turkey Point and St. Lucie NPPs 
survived the Irma hurricane in 2017.
Considering the consequences of meteorological extremes, the transmission 
system also can interrupt the operation, especially the combination of extremes, for 
example, wet snow plus wind and freezing rain plus wind. Since the hydroclimatic 
hazards are relatively slow and predictable phenomena, safety is also ensured by 
reducing the power generation or shutting down the reactors.
A design principle can be mentioned here. Considering the same safety-
related structures, the impact of aircraft crash is covering the impact effects of 
other phenomena, for example, the tornado missiles. The latter is covering the 
impact of hail whatever the size of the hail is. Obviously, the design is made for 
the largest effect.
6.2 Indirect justification for possibility protection of NPPs
As it has been summarized above, experiences demonstrated that the plants 
designed in compliance with nuclear standards can survive the effects of the vibra-
tory ground motion even due to disastrous earthquake. However, severe accidents 
can be caused by phenomena accompanying or generated by the earthquakes. The 
severe accident of the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant was caused by tsunami. Other 
earthquake-related damaging phenomena can be the surface faulting and the soil 
liquefaction.
6.2.1 Liquefaction
In case of new plant, if the potential for soil liquefaction is recognized, the site 
shall be qualified as unacceptable, unless proven engineering solutions are available 
for the soil improvement [8]. For screening out the hazard, the factor of safety to 
liquefaction should be calculated by conservative deterministic method, or a probabi-
listic liquefaction hazard analysis should be performed. In case of operating NPPs, the 
liquefaction hazard and its safety relevance have been recognized either by periodic 
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or focused safety reviews. Typical failure modes due to liquefaction are the tilting due 
to differential settlement, structural failures caused by tilting, and damages of lifeline 
connection to different buildings. The basic finding of 41 operating NPPs at soil sites 
in the USA [45] revealed that the liquefaction is generally not a safety issue. However, 
if it is the case, liquefaction could be an essential contributor to the core damage. 
Similar conclusion was made on the basis of seismic PSA for Paks NPP, Hungary. In 
this case, a justification of sufficient margin against liquefaction consequences should 
be made applying state-of-the-art techniques and best-estimate methodologies as 
for beyond-design-basis effects. Example for the sophisticated numerical analysis of 
liquefaction hazard and its consequences has been made for Paks NPP [46].
6.2.2 Surface displacement
According to earlier regulatory approach, the existence of surface rupture and 
fault displacement hazard at a site was an exclusion criterion for the site [8, 15]. 
As a consequence of this, the detailed evaluation of hazard and the engineering 
treatment of consequences for nuclear power plants remained for long time an 
early stage of development. The post-Fukushima hazard reviews revealed the 
issue (a summary description of the issue and relevant publications is given, for 
example, in [28]). It’s trivial, an earthquake happens when two blocks of the earth 
suddenly slip past one another, and the energy stored up in the block is released in 
the form of seismic waves. Surface faulting is a displacement that reaches the earth’s 
surface during slip along a fault. However, the manifestation and the measure of 
the displacement depend on the magnitude and local geology. The surface rupture/
fault displacement causes mechanical effects completely differing from the effects 
of vibratory ground motion. That is the reason why a specific term “capable fault” 
has been introduced for this type of faults that is based not on seismological but on 
the engineering considerations. If the fault movement happens just below the plant, 
the consequences could be tilting, foundation and structural failures, and damages 
of lifelines due to differential displacements. However, the safety significance of 
displacement depends on the measure and type of displacement. There are suf-
ficient engineering knowledge and analytical tools to evaluate the consequences of 
surface displacements as it is stated in [15, 28, 47, 48].
7. Operability of nuclear power plants during and after the events
The operability of the plant is defined by the weakest link, that is, by those 
non-safety-related SSCs designed/qualified to withstand low-magnitude effects of 
natural phenomena according to building code or conventional industrial standards 
(e.g., EUROCODE 8 for earthquakes). These magnitudes usually correspond to the 
100 years of return period events. In case of earthquakes, the limit of continuous 
operation is the operation-based earthquake with approximately 100 years of return 
period or 475 years as per EUROCODE 8.
If the return period, T, of the lower magnitude hazard effects is 100 years, the 
probability of exceeding the corresponding magnitude of hazard for the entire opera-
tional lifetime (60 years) is  PE 60 ≥ 0.4528 . This is the probability of the shutdown and 
related economic losses caused by exceedance of magnitude of the operational level.
The relevant hazards limiting the operation for the inland freshwater-cooled 
plants like the Paks NPP in Hungary are the low flow rate in river and high water 
temperature. Controlling parameter for freshwater cooled plants is defined in 
terms of river water temperature measured at some distance from the hot cooling 
water outflow. In these cases, for safety and environmental protection, the power 
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generation is reduced, or the reactors are shutting down. The hydrometeorological 
extremes became more frequent and more severe due to climate changes. Assume 
that the return period of event with the given limiting magnitude will be 50 years 
as an average over the 60 years of operation instead of 100 years. In this case, the 
probability of economic losses will be  PE 60 ≥ 0.7024 . Over the timespan of 60 years, 
the worsening of hydrometeorological conditions and increase of the magnitude 
and frequency of extremes will affect the economy of the nuclear power produc-
tion, especially those plants with freshwater cooling. Even if the values given above 
for the exceedance probability of magnitude of hazards for continuous operation 
might be not precise, the tendency is clearly showing the growing probability for 
economic losses due to climate change for any thermal power plants.
8. Conclusions
The nuclear power plants survived several extreme natural events during 
17,825 reactor years of operation (as per the 1st of December 2018). In spite of the 
Fukushima disaster that was also avoidable, the experience is demonstrating that 
there are sufficient knowledge and engineering means to ensure the safety of the 
nuclear power plants and protect the people and environment even in case of severe 
natural phenomena. In the chapter the conscious approach to hazard and availabil-
ity of proven technical solutions against natural hazards has been demonstrated on 
the practical examples.
It has to be recognized, mother Gaia can cause sad surprises, outliers, black 
swans, and dragon kings that should not be “ab ovo” excluded from considerations. 
However, these are “products” of probabilistic considerations. Probabilistic consid-
erations that are also accounting the epistemic uncertainty should be the basis of 
and generic approach to hazard and safety. Although the nuclear industry is widely 
using the argumentation with the small probabilities, the era of neglecting low 
probabilities is passed. It may seem to be a fatalist attitude; the new design paradigm 
is to provide necessary provisions and procedures for managing severe emergency 
situations, since a devastating natural event can never be completely ruled out.
Living in the word of risk, we should be aware what we do not know, and our 
lack of knowledge should be compensated consciously. Over the centuries of 
industrial era, risk has been always compensated by obvious benefits for the society. 
Obviously and with good reasons, this has changed nowadays. There are obvi-
ous and at the same time not fully understandable reasons for sensitivity and low 
tolerance of the society against the nuclear industry. To overcome this, the nuclear 
industry is making the necessary moves also with respect to the nuclear safety 
against natural hazards.
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